INTRODUCTION
In my 2013 article, The Decline of Class Actions, 1 I explained that the Supreme Court and the federal circuits have made it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to litigate class actions. I did not declare the class action device dead, but I did express concern that it had been severely weakened.
As I noted in Decline, the Supreme Court had in the past several years issued a number of seminal decisions, including Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 2 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 3 and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. 4 Federal circuit courts had also introduced new limits on class actions, including cases imposing rigid standards for numerosity, frontloading of merits evidence, class definition, and many other topics. 5 A recurring theme of both the Supreme Court and circuit cases was that class certification creates irresistible (and improper) pressure on defendants to settle even baseless claims. 6 Reviewing the landscape four years later, I believe it is unlikelyany time soon-that the Supreme Court or the circuits will overrule the seminal decisions discussed in Decline. The plaintiffs' bar, however, has been hoping that, even if those key precedents are not overruled, at least the case law will not get more onerous. And indeed, four years after my pessimistic article, the plaintiffs' bar has reason for optimism. For lawyers, as for physicians, "the first goal . . . is to stop the bleeding." 7 In the class action field, that is now happening.
One obvious development is the February 13, 2016 death of Justice Scalia, the author of several of the Supreme Court's restrictive class action opinions, including Dukes, Concepcion, and Italian Colors. The impact of Justice Scalia's death has been significant, par-ticularly during the months before Justice Gorsuch was seated. 8 In addition, there can be little doubt that eight years of judicial appointments by President Obama have shifted the political balance in the circuits. 9 Nonetheless, personnel changes at the Supreme Court and the circuits are only part of the explanation. Many of the key Supreme Court developments discussed herein pre-date Justice Scalia's death, and some of the recent circuit decisions refusing to cut back on class actions were written by Republican-appointed judges.
In this article, I focus on three important developments: First, in the past few years, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a host of high-profile class actions, notwithstanding urgent pleas by the business community that review by the Court was essential.
Second, in the past few years, the Supreme Court has taken a measured (and, in some instances, decidedly pro-plaintiff) approach to class actions. In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, the Court reined in the growing circuit trend to require substantial merits determinations at the class certification stage. 10 13 the Supreme Court issued rulings that rejected broad theories urged by the defendants.
Third, in the past few years, the circuits have frequently rejected defendants' interpretations of Supreme Court cases and other arguments that would have imposed strict, new limits on class certification. 8 For instance, only days after Justice Scalia's death, Dow Chemical withdrew a petition for certiorari in a case challenging a verdict of more than a billion dollars, choosing instead to settle the case for $835 million. Dow stated that it was doing so because Justice Scalia's death had significantly reduced the odds that certiorari would be granted. See, e.g., Jef Feeley & Greg Stohr, Scalia's Death Prompts Dow to Settle Suits for $835 Million, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 26, 2016) , https://bol.bna.com/scalias-death-prompts-dow-tosettle-suits-for-835-million/. 9 See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Building Legacy, Obama Reshapes Appellate Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/us/politics/buildinglegacy-obama-reshapes-appellate-bench.html?_r=0 ("For the first time in more than a decade, judges appointed by Democratic presidents considerably outnumber judges appointed by Republican presidents."). 10 133 S. Ct. 1184 Ct. , 1191 As I explain below, one explanation for these developments is that courts have reacted negatively to overly aggressive advocacy by defendants. Another is that courts are simply taking a break from their strident approach, which has already resulted in significant cutbacks in class actions. Furthermore, I believe that courts have backed away from the oft-cited view that the pressure to settle is itself a reason to curtail class actions. While that theme still appears as a consideration in whether to grant review under Rule 23(f), it has all but disappeared as a rationale for restricting class actions. Instead, courts have adopted a more measured-and, in my view, more justifiedapproach: looking at each case based on its particular facts and circumstances.
It remains to be seen whether these developments represent the new normal, or instead are only a pause before the decline of class actions continues. Given the election of Donald Trump as President, and the likelihood that he will appoint jurists who may embrace further limits on class actions, there is reason for concern about the future.
Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, who was confirmed on April 7, 2017, is likely to take a conservative position on class actions similar to that of Justice Scalia, although perhaps without the same degree of zeal. Justice Gorsuch himself has stated that he is neither pro-nor anti-class action, 14 but there is no shortage of articles attempting to predict his stance on class action issues. 15 At bottom, he is unlikely to favor expanding class actions in a particular case absent a compelling basis in Rule 23. And he has shown that he is willing to 14 13, 2017) , http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/Judge-NeilGorsuch-Potential-Impact-on-Development-of-Class-Action-Law.aspx (predicting that Justice Gorsuch will rule based on the plain language of the Class Action Fairness Act).
import restrictive Rule 23(b)(3) concepts into Rule 23(b)(2). 16 At the same time, it is not clear that Justice Gorsuch will have the same anticlass action agenda exhibited by Justice Scalia. 17 In addition to the impact of Justice Gorsuch's appointment and the likelihood of further vacancies on the Supreme Court over the next four years, there are currently 144 vacancies on the lower federal courts, 18 with many more vacancies likely over the next four years. With a string of conservative appointments at all levels of the federal bench, it is impossible to say how long the current reprieve will last. But even if it is only temporary, it is a welcome change from years of court decisions curtailing class actions.
Finally, although this Article focuses on case law developments, it should be noted that even if the current reprieve in the case law proves to be more than just ephemeral, Congress may step in and pass major legislation curtailing class actions. At the time this Article went to press, the Fairness in Class Actions Litigation Act of 2017 19 had passed the House of Representatives and was pending in the Senate. The bill, which has drawn widespread criticism from the plaintiffs' bar and many scholars and commentators, 20 the class action device. Among other things, in its current form it would codify (or even expand) the heightened ascertainability requirement that has been adopted by some courts, 21 would arguably preclude certification in cases involving individualized damages, 22 and would create a higher threshold for class certification-requiring courts to conduct a frontloaded merits analysis contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Amgen. 23 It is almost certain that President Trump would sign the bill in its current form. Thus, there is reason for concern that, even if the case law trends remain favorable for class actions, Congress and the President will reverse this progress.
I SUPREME COURT DENIALS OF CERTIORARI
In the past few years, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a number of high-profile cases that could have been effective vehicles to impose new limits on class actions. This trend stands in marked contrast to the Court's prior approach as I recounted in Decline. As I explained there, looking at the case law as of 2013, it appeared that a majority of the Supreme Court was on a mission to rein in class actions. The Court not only granted certiorari in a significant number of class action cases, but also took an unusually aggressive role in shaping the issues to be decided.
For question presented. 28 Ultimately, the Court did not reach even its own rewritten question because it found that Comcast had failed to preserve the issue. 29 Usually, in such a circumstance, the Court would dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted, 30 but in Comcast, the Court proceeded to decide the case in Comcast's favor on the ground that plaintiffs' expert model was flawed and thus could not establish classwide damages. 31 The Court also took a very aggressive role in the context of class action waivers and arbitration agreements, deciding three important cases on the topic-Concepcion, Italian Colors, and DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia 32 -since 2011.
In many of these seminal Supreme Court cases, the business community had mobilized substantial amicus support at the certiorari stage (as well as at the merits stage). 33 For instance, nine amicus briefs in support of certiorari were filed in Dukes, four were filed in Concepcion, and four were filed in Italian Colors. Multiple amicus briefs in support of certiorari were also filed in two of the three 2015 Term class action cases: seven in Tyson Foods and seven in Spokeo. While it is difficult to know the precise impact of these amicus briefs, it is reasonable to assume that they played a part in the Court's decision to hear so many class action cases given its limited docket.
But the surprising trend in the past few years is the number of class action cases that the Court has refused to hear, notwithstanding strong pleas from the business community. For instance, in Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 34 Sears sought review of a Seventh Circuit decision upholding class certification in a case alleging defective (mold producing) front-loading washing machines. Sears sought review on issues of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) and on whether a class may be certified when most class members did not experience the 28 See Decline, supra note 1, at 753-54 & n.142 (contrasting the question upon which Comcast sought review with the question upon which the Court granted review). 29 alleged product defect. 35 The Supreme Court granted review, vacated the judgment, and remanded in light of Comcast. 36 On remand, the Seventh Circuit adhered to its earlier opinion upholding class certification. 37 Sears again petitioned for certiorari, 38 and eight amicus briefs were filed in support of certiorari. 39 Yet, the Court denied certiorari, with no Justice dissenting. 40 Another moldy washing machine case had a parallel history. In Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, the Supreme Court initially granted review of, vacated, and remanded a Sixth Circuit decision upholding class certification, also in light of Comcast. 41 When the Sixth refused to reverse its ruling, 42 Whirlpool again sought certiorari, 43 supported by the same eight amici who filed briefs in Sears. 44 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case as well, again with no dissent. 45 Given the Supreme Court's heavy focus on class actions in recent years, the Court's denial of review in these cases surprised many on both the plaintiff and the defense sides. These denials pre-dated Justice Scalia's death; thus, there were clearly four potential votes for certiorari, the number required to grant review, among the conservative Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito).
Moreover, given all of the firepower supporting the petitioners in Sears and Whirlpool, it was logical to think that the Court would be persuaded that the issues were important. This was especially so given that the amici predicted dire and profound consequences from the failure to grant review. Illustrative is the combined brief filed by the Chamber in Sears and Whirlpool. The Chamber, which touts itself as "the world's largest business organization representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses," 46 argued that, if the rulings were allowed to stand, they would "dramatically increase the class-action exposure" faced by the business community. 47 The Chamber also invoked the unfair pressure to settle:
In light of the costs of discovery and trial, certification unleashes "hydraulic" pressure to settle. That pressure is generally less rooted in the merits of the plaintiffs' claims than in the economic rationality of defendants, meaning that class certification-particularly certification based on a loose application of Rule 23's essential prerequisites-dramatically increases the chances that plaintiffs with even meritless claims will obtain an unwarranted payout. 48 Yet, despite these and similar arguments by petitioners and amici, the Court denied review without dissent.
Similarly 57 In Rikos, a consumer fraud case, the primary issue was whether a district court, in certifying a class, must evaluate whether there is a "common injury" that cohesively binds the plaintiffs. 58 The Chamber, in an amicus in support of certiorari, noted that while the decision was an "outlier," review was necessary because "all it takes is one overly permissive circuit for abusive litigation to take hold." 59 The International Association of Defense Counsel (IADC) also filed an amicus brief in support of certiorari. 60 Yet, the Court denied review. 61 What explains the Court's denial of certiorari in these cases? My own sense is that, at least for now, the Court has lost interest in announcing major new limits on class actions. It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court to target an area, focus on it rigorously in several cases, and then decline to hear other cases. A similar scenario took place in the area of punitive damages; the Court granted review and decided a number of punitive damages cases, and then became much 54 less interested in the topic. 62 Having given so much attention to class actions in recent years, the Justices may simply be ready for a break from the topic, and thus not especially eager to add class action cases to the docket. Of course, the Justices could also be stepping back to see how the lower courts apply cases such as Dukes, Concepcion, and Amgen.
Relatedly, while the threat of "blackmail pressure to settle" may at one time have been persuasive, that mantra has lost its punch. Various amici have invoked it so many times in recent years that, I believe, the Court has become numb to it. Indeed, that argument has become increasingly tenuous because, as I have noted elsewhere, defendants are more willing than ever to go to trial in large, bet-thecompany class action cases. 63 For example, after the Court denied review in Whirlpool, the company went to trial and won. 64 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly disparaged the "blackmail settlement" rationale, it has come close. 65 Recently, other courts have explicitly disparaged the rationale. 66 Moreover, it is my opinion that, wholly apart from the unpersuasive reliance on the "pressure to settle," the business community has suffered a lack of credibility in its amicus strategy. When numerous amicus briefs are filed in one class action after another, trumpeting the same parade of horribles for businesses, the message inevitably gets diluted. 67 After all, the Court grants review and oral argument in only about 60-80 cases per year out of more than 7,500 petitions filed. 68 The Chamber's brief in Rikos illustrates the problem of overstated arguments. Even though the Chamber admitted that the case was an "outlier," it claimed that this one flawed case would lead to an avalanche of bad decisions. 69 Interestingly, the Chamber's aggressive amicus strategy on behalf of the business community appears to be deliberate and recent. Its litigation arm, the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, was created in 1977, but it was completely revamped in 2010 because "inside the [Chamber] some clamored for a more aggressive approach." 70 The Center hired a number of former Bush Administration officials to write amicus briefs, and as a result "the Chamber became more active before the Supreme Court and throughout the U.S. court system." 71 It is possible that this deliberate strategy has backfired and that the Chamber would have been better off filing fewer, more carefully targeted amicus briefs.
To be sure, the Court will continue to grant review in class action cases that meet the high standards for certiorari. Thus, in January 2017, it granted review to decide whether arbitration agreements that bar class actions are unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act and thus unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. 72 The circuits are indisputably in conflict on the question. 73 Also in January 2017, it granted review to decide whether tolling under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah 74 applies to a three-year time limit contained in section 3 of the 1933 Securities Act. 75 The Court had granted review on that issue in 2014, 76 but the parties settled before the Court could resolve the case. 77 And in January 2016, the Court granted review in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker to determine whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification where plaintiffs have sought to obtain immediate review by voluntarily dismissing their individual claims with prejudice. 78 Thus, I am not suggesting that the Court is now denying review simply because a case raises a class action issue. What I am suggesting, however, is that the Court will not reach out and decide a case merely because the business community says the case is important and invokes the mantra of blackmail pressure to settle. For now at least, the Court does not appear to be on a conscious mission to scale back class actions.
II RECENT SUPREME COURT CLASS ACTION RULINGS

A. The Court's 2013 Amgen Opinion
In Decline, I discussed the trend among various circuits in favor of frontloading evidence (and resolving merits issues) at the class certification stage. 79 These cases have led some courts to essentially require mini-trials at the class certification stage, even when no merits discovery has occurred. In its 6-3 decision in Amgen Inc. v. 80 the Supreme Court reined in that approach, drawing a sharp distinction between the district court's role at the class certification stage and its role at the summary judgment stage. The Court cautioned against "put[ting] the cart before the horse," 81 and emphasized that Rule 23 is not a "license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage." 82 It explained that "Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class." 83 Even two of the conservative Justices (Roberts and Alito) joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court. 84 Importantly, the Court gave short shrift to defendant's argument that a plaintiff needed to prove materiality at the class certification stage because certification places unfair pressure on defendants to settle. The Court was sending a clear message that class certification decisions should focus on the requirements of Rule 23, not on the strength of the underlying claims.
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B. 2015 Term
In the 2015 Term, the Supreme Court decided three closely watched class action cases: Tyson Foods v 87 Each of these cases had the potential to weaken the class action device, and many observers viewed the granting of certiorari in those cases-three in one term-as a signal that the Court was poised to do further significant damage. 88 But in each case, the Court rejected broad arguments urged by defendants.
Tyson Foods, which addressed the propriety of plaintiffs' use of statistical evidence, was brought as a class action for state law claims and as a collective action for claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 89 The members of those aggregate actions were workers at a pork-processing facility who alleged entitlement to overtime based upon the time involved in "donning and doffing" protective gear and walking to and from their work areas. 90 To prove their case, given Tyson Foods's failure to preserve relevant records, plaintiffs relied on an expert study that purported to calculate the average donning and 81 Id. at 1191. 82 Id. at 1194-95. 83 Id. at 1191 (second emphasis added). 84 doffing time based on a non-random sample of employees. 91 At trial, the expert admitted that there was significant variation among class members because they performed different jobs, used different equipment, and put on different quantities of protective gear depending on the specific work performed. 92 Another plaintiff expert used the average to calculate classwide damages but conceded that many of the employees did not suffer injury because they did not work more than forty hours per week. 93 The jury found for the plaintiffs, and a divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed. 94 The Supreme Court, in a 6-2 decision, rejected the aggressive argument by Tyson Foods and several of its amici for "[a] categorical exclusion" of statistical proof in class actions, noting that such a ruling "would make little sense." 95 The Court explained that statistical proof "is used in various substantive realms of the law," 96 and is sometimes " 'the only practical means to collect and present relevant data' establishing a defendant's liability." 97 According to the Court, "[i]n a case where representative evidence is relevant in proving a plaintiff's individual claim, that evidence cannot be deemed improper merely because the claim is brought on behalf of a class." 98 Applying those principles, the Court found that, because Tyson Foods had failed to keep proper records, statistical proof would have been admissible in an individual case. 99 Thus, such evidence was properly admitted in the aggregate trial.
This ruling has been characterized as a narrow one that, ultimately, is not harmful to plaintiffs. 100 If anything, a few commentators view it as an important pro-plaintiff ruling that has the potential to greatly expand plaintiffs' ability to use statistical evidence in class actions. 101 Also in Tyson Foods, the petitioner raised the issue of whether an aggregate action may be maintained "when the class contains hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages." 102 The Court did not address the Article III question, concluding that it was not "fairly presented [ 106 The second case, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 107 involved a tactic whereby a defendant attempts to "pick off" a class representative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 108 by offering the full judgment sought by the representative. The goal is to moot not only the representative's own claim but also the putative class action complaint, with the hope that new class representatives will not emerge. Gomez was the class representative in a putative class action alleging that Campbell-Ewald violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 109 which bars "using any automatic telephone dialing system" to send a text message to a cell phone without the recipient's consent. 110 Prior to the deadline for the motion for class certification, Campbell-Ewald proposed to settle Gomez's individual claims for their full value. 111 Gomez did not accept the offer, and it thus lapsed. Campbell-Ewald thereafter argued that the unaccepted offer mooted Gomez's individual claims (as well as those of the putative class). 112 The district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected that argument. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the unaccepted offer of judgment did not moot the case and that defendant's contrary argument was unsupported by Rule 68. 113 Limiting the case to its facts, the Court noted: "We need not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff's individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount." 114 The third case, Spokeo v. Robins, 115 involved a putative class action filed by respondent Robins under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 116 claiming that the web site known as "Spokeo" posted inaccurate information about him, thereby harming his prospects for finding work. 117 The defendant argued that Robins had not suffered actual injury. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Robins had adequately alleged that his statutory rights had been violated. 118 Although the Court reversed in a 6-2 ruling, the opinion did not break new ground. The majority reasoned that the Ninth Circuit erred in its Article III analysis by focusing solely on particularity and not on concreteness. According to the Court, the fact that Congress has "identif[ied] and elevat[ed]" intangible interests "does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement . . . ." 119 Yet, the Court stated that even a "risk of real harm" can satisfy the concreteness requirement. 120 The dissenters agreed with most of the majority's legal analysis but merely disagreed about the need for a remand under the specific facts. 121 Had the Court issued a sweeping opinion, the case could have eliminated many statutory damages class actions (which, according to the business community, were classic "settlement pressure" cases). 122 But the Court left open the possibility that many such cases can still go forward.
These decisions cannot be explained by Justice Scalia's death. He participated in the 6-3 Campbell-Ewald decision, joining Chief Justice Roberts's dissent. And while both Tyson Foods and Spokeo postdated his death, his vote would not have changed the outcome in either case because both were 6-2 decisions.
All three decisions avoided establishing sweeping, bright-line tests. None of the them even alluded to the pressure to settle as a guiding principle or in any way suggested that class actions are typically abusive and unfair. Although Spokeo was resolved against the plaintiff, the decision left open a path for the plaintiff's case to go forward after review on remand. Both Tyson Foods and CampbellEwald were plaintiff victories, and in both cases the Court was critical of defendants' overly aggressive arguments. In short, what began as a potential watershed Supreme Court term for class actions ended with a whimper.
C. 2016 Term
In the 2016 Term, the Supreme Court decided three cases that could negatively impact class actions. Nonetheless, I do not view these decisions-either individually or collectively-as reflecting any sort of anti-class action agenda on the part of the Court.
First, in Microsoft v. Baker, 123 the Court unanimously held that a class representative cannot voluntarily dismiss his or her case with prejudice after a denial of class certification (and subsequent denial of Rule 23(f) review) and then appeal the class certification decision as a final judgment. The majority, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, determined that the tactic was an improper end-run around Rule 23(f) and the final judgment rule. The three concurring justices believed that the outcome was justified because there was no Article III case or controversy. 124 The case simply reflects the Court's rejection of an attempt to circumvent the final judgment rule and the limited grounds for interlocutory review under Rule 23(f).
Second, in California Public Employees' Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., 125 the Court held (in a 5-4 decision) that tolling under American Pipe 126 does not apply to section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 because the time limit is a statute of repose, which "supersedes the application of a tolling rule based in equity." 127 The Court's opinion did not question the general validity of American Pipe tolling but simply held that tolling does not apply to the particular statute at issue.
Third, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 128 the Court (in an 8-1 decision) took a narrow view of personal jurisdiction, holding that there was no personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers in a suit by more than 600 plaintiffs claiming injuries from the company's blood-thinning drug, Plavix. The Court found no connection between the relevant plaintiffs (who were not California residents) and California, and thus no basis for specific jurisdiction. The case was not a class action, although the rationale could conceivably apply to class actions as well as non-class aggregated cases. 129 The decision does not reflect anti-aggregation sentiment, but is simply another case in which the Court has taken a narrow view of personal jurisdiction. 130 
III RECENT CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS REJECTING PROPOSED NEW LIMITS
On multiple occasions in recent years, the circuits have rebuffed efforts by defendants to push Supreme Court and prior circuit precedents to their limits. Like the Supreme Court's recent decisions, most recent circuit decisions have been fact specific and have avoided the adoption of broad, bright-line rules that would severely restrict class that conclusion in Article III of the Constitution instead of 28 U.S.C. § 1291."). Justice Gorsuch did not participate in the case. 125 141 And two circuits have held, post-Campbell-Ewald, that even if a "pick off" successfully moots a class representative's individual case, the representative should be given an opportunity to seek class certification. 142 These latter decisions, of course, remove all incentive for defendants to make offers of judgment as a way to derail class actions. And postSpokeo, a number of circuits have found no Article III concerns with allegations of purely intangible injuries or mere risk of harm. 143 
B. Damages and Class Certification
In 
C. Impact of Dukes
Dukes has no doubt had an impact on class action jurisprudence. In a number of cases, courts have relied on Dukes to reverse class certification in injunctive suits under Rule 23(b)(2) where a significant component of the case involves damages. 148 Similarly, several circuits have held that employment class actions involving decentralized decision making cannot go forward under Dukes because of a lack of commonality. 149 But the impact of Dukes has been less profound than one might have predicted when it was decided in 2011.
In a recent article, I pointed out that numerous courts have approved Rule 23(b)(2) public interest class actions involving juveniles, prisoners, immigrants, and disabled people notwithstanding Dukes. 150 Moreover, Dukes has by no means meant the end of employment discrimination class actions. As one commentator has observed, " [c] 152 in which the Seventh Circuit, in a decision by Judge Posner, reversed the district court's denial of class certification in a race discrimination case involving 700 African-American brokers currently or formerly employed by Merrill Lynch. 153 The court relied on two company-wide policies that allegedly resulted in a disparate impact. 154 It described Dukes as a case where "there was no company-wide policy to challenge . . . -the only relevant corporate policies were a policy forbidding sex discrimination and a policy of delegating employment decisions to local managers-[and thus] there was no common issue to justify class treatment." 155 Other employment cases have similarly distinguished Dukes. 156 
D. Ascertainability
Under the Third Circuit's "ascertainability" requirement, "[i]f class members are impossible to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or 'mini-trials,' then a class action is inappropriate." 157 As noted earlier, 158 in Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 159 the Seventh Circuit rejected the Third Circuit's ascertainability jurisprudence, and the Supreme Court declined to review that decision. 160 What is particularly interesting, however, is that even the Third Circuit has retreated in the face of overly aggressive advocacy by defendants.
In Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 161 the Third Circuit reversed the denial of class certification on ascertainability grounds. 162 The case alleged damages from spyware installed on leased computers. The putative class included purchasers or lessees of computers, along with their "household members." The court held that the inclusion of "household members" should not derail certification because " 'household members' is a phrase that is easily defined and not, as Defendants argue, inherently vague." 163 Notably, the court criticized defendants for "seiz[ing] upon [the] lack of precision [in the case law] by invoking the ascertainability requirement with increasing frequency in order to defeat class certification." 164 It noted that the doctrine was "narrow" and that "[i]f defendants intend to challenge ascertainability, they must be exacting in their analysis . . . ." 165 Clearly, the court was stating, in judicious terms, that defendants had been too aggressive in relying on ascertainability as a basis for defeating class certification.
E. Standing of Unnamed Class Members
As noted above, 166 Tyson Foods did not decide whether a class action that includes uninjured class members can go forward. Defendants have been aggressive in the circuits in arguing that a class with some uninjured class members is barred by Article III of the Constitution. While defendants have had some success, 167 several circuits have rejected the argument. 168 As the Seventh Circuit put it, "How many (if any) of the class members have a valid claim is the issue to be determined after the class is certified." 169 Or, as the Third Circuit put it: "[U]nnamed, putative class members need not establish Article III standing." 170 This standing issue would have been low-hanging fruit to any circuit that was determined to cut back on class actions in a dramatic fashion. The fact that a number of circuits have refused to embrace defendants' arguments is noteworthy.
F. Arbitration Clauses
The Supreme Court's most recent arbitration cases-Concepcion, Italian Colors, and DIRECTV-have made it very difficult for plaintiffs to circumvent arbitration agreements and class action waivers. Not surprisingly, a number of circuit cases have relied on those authorities in rejecting efforts by plaintiffs to avoid such agreements and waivers. 171 Nonetheless, there have been some surprising proplaintiff developments at the circuit level.
Most importantly, contrary to several other circuits, 172 the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that arbitration agreements and class action waivers in employment cases are unenforceable under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 173 and that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 174 does not require a contrary conclusion. For example, in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 175 the Seventh Circuit determined that the FAA "work[s] hand in glove" with the NLRA. 176 The Ninth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, 177 and the Supreme Court has granted review as noted above. 178 Regardless of the outcome, the point for present purposes is that, even in the arbitration area, with several sweeping Supreme Court cases to grapple with, some circuits have been unwilling to enforce arbitration agreements and class action waivers in employment cases.
G. Consumer Class Actions
As discussed above, the Supreme Court declined to review the Sixth and Seventh Circuit "moldy washing machine" cases, thus leaving these important precedents intact. In Sears, the Seventh Circuit (in an opinion by Judge Posner) recognized that predominance is not "determined simply by counting noses: that is, [by] determining whether there are more common issues or more individual issues . . . ." 179 The court also recognized that it is "more efficient" to decide common liability issues once than to litigate them "separately in hundreds of different trials." 180 In Whirlpool, the Sixth Circuit noted that " [u] se of the class method [was] warranted particularly because class members are not likely to file individual actions-the cost of litigation would dwarf any potential recovery." 181 In Reyes v. Netdeposit, LLC, 182 a 2015 case involving allegations of a fraudulent telemarketing scheme and unauthorized debits from bank accounts, the Third Circuit reversed the denial of class certification. In so holding, the court reasoned: "Class actions are often the only practical check against the kind of widespread mass-marketing scheme alleged here." 183 It noted that "[t]he individual claims arising from such conduct are usually too small to justify suit unless aggregated in a class action." 184 In Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 185 another case that the Supreme Court declined to review, 186 the Sixth Circuit upheld class certification in a case alleging that Procter & Gamble's probiotic, Align, did not work as advertised. The court found that the common question-whether Align is snake oil that does not work for anyoneis one that "will yield a common answer for the entire class that goes to the heart of whether P & G will be found liable under the relevant false-advertising laws." 187 All four cases recognized that small-claim consumer cases were especially suitable for classwide litigation. These cases are the antithesis of hostility to class actions. * * * Like the Supreme Court's recent opinions, the recent circuit cases, for the most part, do not reflect hostility to class actions. In general, they are cautious, narrow, and generally unreceptive to defendants' requests to impose sweeping new limits on class actions. Exceptions can be found, but the overall tenor of the recent case law is notable. Importantly, the "pressure to settle" rationale for limiting class actions has all but disappeared from circuit court decisions in the past few years.
CONCLUSION
For those (such as myself) who believe that the class action device is a valuable tool in many kinds of cases, the reprieve I have described in the Supreme Court and the circuits is a welcome change from years of adverse case law. How long this reprieve will last, however, is anyone's guess.
